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An efficient fragile image watermarking technique for pixel level tamper detection and resistance is proposed. It uses five most
significant bits of the pixels to generate watermark bits and embeds them in the three least significant bits. The proposed technique
uses a logistic map and takes advantage of its sensitivity property to a small change in the initial condition. At the same time,
it incorporates the confusion/diffusion and hashing techniques used in many cryptographic systems to resist tampering at pixel
level as well as at block level. This paper also presents two new approaches called nonaggressive and aggressive tamper detection
algorithms. Simulations show that the proposed technique can provide more than 99.39% tamper detection capability with less
than 2.31% false-positive detection and less than 0.61% false-negative detection responses.
1. Introduction
Fragile image watermarking has been proposed to authenti-
cate digital images and detect tampering. In general, water-
marks are generated from the most significant bits (MSB)
and then embedded into the least significant bits (LSB) of the
pixels while maintaining the image quality. The fragile image
watermarking schemes also provide a procedure (or rules) to
detect tampering at pixel level or block level. They assume
the attacker’s goal is not to change the watermark in the LSBs
but to modify the MSBs so that the watermark generation
algorithm produces the same watermarks. As image quality is
also of paramount importance to fragile image watermarking
schemes, more MSBs are used for watermark generation
than the number of LSBs used for watermark embedding.
It leads to many-to-one mapping between MSBs and LSBs
and provides the attackers an opportunity to have more
alternative MSBs for the same watermark, and this makes the
watermarking fragile.
One of the original fragile image watermarking tech-
niques was proposed in 1995 by Walton [1], and it is a
7MSB:1LSB technique (i.e., it uses 7 MSBs for watermark
generation and 1 LSB for watermark embedding). It is
a blockwise technique and it cannot detect pixel-level
tampering. This drawback is called a localization problem
and it was reported by Fridrich in 2002 [2]. Subsequently,
fragile watermarking techniques have been developed to
address localization problem [3–5]. Recently, Zhang and
Wang proposed two related 5MSB:3LSB fragile watermark-
ing techniques [6, 7]. The first method is a statistical
technique which is capable of detecting pixel-level tampering
if the tampered area is small. The second one improves the
tamper detection capability for a larger area by incorporating
a hybrid (blockwise and pixelwise) mechanism. However,
the use of block information reduces its tamper resistance
capability. At the same time, chaotic map-based fragile
watermark has been proposed to improve both tamper
resistance and detection capabilities. In [8], the difference
between the image and a chaotic map is used along with
pixel pairs for watermark generation and embedding. It is a
7MSB:1LSB technique and enhances tamper resistance more
than tamper detection (in this scheme, the localization is
restricted to pixel pairs). In [9], a blockwise 7MSB:1LSB frag-
ile watermarking technique is proposed using two chaotic
maps, one to select pixel locations for embedding and the
other to generate watermarks. In this scheme, the localization
is restricted to 2 × 2 pixel blocks. In [10], a composite
chaotic iterative function is used along with a 7-MSB seed
value to generate chaotic sequence. The chaotic sequence is
used to choose a bit for watermark from the 7 MSBs. It is
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Figure 1: (a) Proposed fragile watermarking generation and
embedding process and modules; (b) Proposed tamper detection
process and modules.
also a 7MSB:1LSB technique and provides pixel-level tamper
detection with the detection rate of only 50%.
This paper proposes a 5MSB:3LSB technique that uses
logistic map and confusion/diffusion and hashing cryp-
tographic techniques to improve tamper detection and
resistance capabilities. It also uses a key and pseudorandom
number generator to select secure pixels for watermark
embedding. The confusion process is used to induce
complexity in the relation map between the distribution
of the watermark and the value of the user-defined key.
Similarly, the diffusion process is used to dissipate the image
property displayed in the 5MSBs of a pixel over a long-
range statistics of the watermark using the logistic-map. The
chaotic behavior of the logistic-map is also used as hashing
mechanism to generate a set of 3-bits watermarks. This
proposed technique is discussed in Section 2. This paper also
proposes new concepts called nonaggressive (NgTDM) and
aggressive (AgTDM) scenarios for efficient tamper detection
and these scenarios are presented in Section 3 of this paper.
Simulation results and findings are presented in Section 4. A
conclusion is also presented in Acknowledgement.
2. Proposed Watermarking Scheme
Figure 1 presents a fragile watermarking scheme. Figure 1(a)
shows modules, namely, watermarks generation (WMG)
and watermarks embedding (WME). In this scheme, WMG
generates three-bit watermark from the 5MSBs of each
pixel using a logistic map and a key (k1). Then, WME
pseudorandomly embeds this watermark into the 3LSBs by
selecting pixels using a key (k2). Figure 1(b) shows four
more modules (and WMG): watermark extraction (WMX),
tamper detection using nonaggressiveness (MET1), tamper
detection using aggressiveness (MET2), and final detection
(DET). WMX extracts the watermarks in the LSBs of an
input image using the key (k2).
In parallel, WMG generates 3-bit watermark from the
5MSBs of each pixel using the same logistic map and the
key k1. The modules MET1 and MET2 use the watermarks
(extracted and generated) to detect tampered pixels. MET1
uses a nonaggressive approach; hence, it is possible to have
false-negative pixels in the detection results. A tampered
pixel that is detected as not-tampered is called false-negative
pixel. MET2 uses an aggressive approach and it artificially
increases false-positive pixels in the detection results. A not-
tampered pixel that is detected as tampered is called false-
positive pixel. Combining these two detection results, the
DET detects tampered pixels with very high accuracy.
2.1. Watermark Generation and Embedding Process. Suppose
O is the original image and P is its exact copy image. The copy
image P is used in the process of generating 3-bit watermarks
and the 3LSB of the original image O is replaced with the
watermark. Now suppose P contains 8N pixels and the gray
value of its (i, j)th pixel is denoted by pi j , where i = 1 · · ·N1,
j = 1 · · ·N2,N1 ·N2 = 8N , and pi, j ∈ [0, 255]. Let us denote
the bits of the pixel pi j by (pi j(8), pi j(7), pi j(6), pi j(5), pi j(4),
pi j(3), pi j(2), pi j(1)); then the first 5 bits (left to right) are the
most significant bits (MSB) and the last three bits are the least
significant bits (LSB). Using the modules in Figure 1(a), the
proposed watermark generation and embedding processes
are explained step by step in this section.
Step 1. In homogeneous image regions, it is likely high that
the majority of the pixels have the same intensity values and
hence the majority of the fragile watermarks generated in
that region will be the same too. To address this problem,
the bits pi j(4) of the copy image P are pseudorandomly
modified using the key k1. Modifying this low-significant bit
of the MSB will help to generate fragile watermarks that differ
between homogeneous regions with respect to their intensity
values. It is important to note that the homogeneous regions
are not identified separately and treated differently in this
step; instead the modification of the 4th bits of all the
pixels in the image takes care of the stated security problem
associated with the homogeneous regions.
Step 2. In this step, LSBs of the gray values pi j(i · j =
1 · · · 8N) are replaced by bits 0 so that the watermarks
to be generated for each pixel depend only on the MSBs
of the corresponding pixel. Let us denote the modified
image as Q and its gray value as qi j , where qi j =
(pi j(8), pi j(7), pi j(6), pi j(5), pi j(4), 0, 0, 0).
Step 3. A sequence of M+ 2 integers are generated for (i, j)th
pixel using qi j /248 as an initial value in the logistic map in
(1) [11] until they pass a randomness test. In this equation,
xi j(0) = qi j /248 and k = 0 · · ·M + 1. The nonlinearity
parameter value of 4 is selected to achieve a maximum chaos
in the map.
xi j(k + 1) = 4 · xi j(k) ·
(
1− xi j(k)
)
. (1)
Hence we have 8N(= N1 · N2) integers, xi j(k), for each
k and the integers xi j(k) i = 1 · · ·N1, j = 1 · · ·N2 pass
the runs test used in [12] for all k = M − 1,M,M + 1.
These chaotic unpredictable integers will be used to generate
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3 images ci j(M − 1), ci j(M), and ci j(M + 1) according to the
following round function:
ci j(k) = round
(
255 · xi j(k)
)
. (2)
Although the runs test shows unpredictability around
M = 16, a large value (i.e., M = 81) is arbitrarily selected
to guarantee the unpredictability for many images. From the
corresponding pixels in these three images the bits for the
intermediate watermark are generated. This process provides
a hashing mechanism to the proposed approach. The hashing
can be done in many ways but in the proposed approach we
select the 6th bit (and 3rd bit in Step 5) of the i jth pixel of
the three images to map the corresponding 5MSBs that were
used to generate these three images. Hence if the attacker
wants to tamper the image he or she should maintain the
pattern by modifying the image such that it gives the same
bits at these bit positions for the three images. We selected
3rd and 6th bits because they form patterns based on the
following: (i) they divide the bit positions equally, that is, 1
and 2; 4 and 5, and 7 and 8, (ii) the 3rd bit and below are used
for watermarking, and (iii) the 6th bit and above are used for
image understanding [13]. The intermediate watermark bits
are denoted by di j(1), di j(2), and di j(3).
Step 4. A key k1 is used to pseudorandomly permute the
pixels of image Q. The permutated image shows a noise-like
structure. The noise-like image is divided into 8 partitions
such that each partition has the same number of pixels. The
LSBs of the pixels in partition 1 are replaced with bit (0,0,0);
the LSBs of the pixels in partition 2 are replaced with bit
(0,0,1), and so on. Using the same key, the permutation pixels
are reassigned to their original positions. This process assigns
the three bits of either (0,0,0), (0,0,1), (0,1,0), (0,1,1), (1,0,0),
(1,0,1), (1,1,0), or (1,1,1) to the LSBs with equal probability.
The pixels of this modified image R are denoted by ri j .
Step 5. As per Step 3, integers are generated using ri j /255 as
an initial value in the following equation:
yi j(k + 1) = 4 · yi j(k) ·
(
1− yi j(k)
)
, (3)
where yi j(0) = ri j /255 and k = 0 · · · 81. Using this logistic
map sequence, their corresponding gray values are generated
using the following round function as earlier:
ei j(k) = round
(
255 · yi j(k)
)
. (4)
Three consecutive integers ei j(80), ei j(81), and ei j(82)
are selected from this chaotic sequence. Using these three
integers, their 3rd bits are selected to obtain 3 bits fi j(1),
fi j(2), and fi j(3).
Step 6. In this step, the final watermark (wij(1), wij(2),
wij(3)) is generated as a combination of the intermediate
watermarks (di j(1), di j(2), di j(3)) and ( fi j(1), fi j(2), fi j(3))
as follows:
wij(1) = di j(1)⊕ fi j(1),
wij(2) = di j(2)⊕ fi j(2),
wij(3) = di j(3)⊕ fi j(3).
(5)
The logical operator ⊕ represents the exclusive OR. Steps
1 through to 6 provide the watermark generation process in
WMG module and they provide fragile watermark through
confusion, diffusion, and hashing cryptographic techniques.
(5) gives us 3 watermark bit planes w(1), w(2), and w(3)
where (i, j)th bit of w(l) is wij(l) and l = 1, 2, 3. We have
24N bits in all and these bits will be pseudorandomly mixed
using the key k2 and embedded into the 3 LSBs of the original
image O. This will provide additional cryptographic strength
via this extra confusion process. The watermarked image of
O is denoted by Pw and its (i, j)th pixel is denoted by pwi j .
2.2. Complexity and Tamper Resistance. Tamper resistance
measures the difficulty level of finding another pixel for a
pixel within the same block, another homogeneous region
for a homogeneous region in the same image, or another
block for a block in the same image (or a different image)
for replacement (tampering) by the attacker without altering
the watermark while maintaining the quality of the image.
Hence we quantify the tamper resistance as the probability
(let us denote it by TRP in this paper) of failure of finding
replacement pixels or blocks by random guess or systematic
approach by an attacker. Thus, Step 1 is carried out to resist
tampering in homogeneous regions; Step 2 is carried out
to make the 3 LSB-bit watermark dependent on the 5MSB-
bits and fragile; Step 3 is carried out to make the fragile
watermarks independent of each other; Steps 4 and 5 are
to eliminate the statistical property of the image present in
the watermark; Step 6 is carried out to resist tampering in
any part of the image. It means that the statistical properties,
such as the frequency count of similar blocks or regions and
local variance and mean of a block or an image region should
not be noticeable in the watermark, because it will help the
attacker to guess the pixel, image block, or image region for
tampering.
2.3. Pixel-Level Tamper Detection. Figure 1(b) shows the
process of pixel-level tamper detection. The module WMX
accepts a watermarked image Pw and extracts the water-
marks wij(1), wij(2), and wij(3) from the 3LSBs using the
same key k2 and pseudorandom number generator used
in watermark embedding. In parallel, the module WMG
generates watermark bits w′i j(1), w
′
i j(2), w
′
i j(3) from the
5MSBs of Pw, as explained earlier, using the key k1. These
watermarks (extracted and generated) are used in MET1 and
MET2 modules. They use NgTDM and AgTDM methods,
respectively, to detect tampered pixels. The nonaggressive
tamper detection approach NgTDM is defined as follows:
Wij =Wij(1) |Wij(2) |Wij(3). (6)
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The logical operator “|” represents the logical OR. The
operand bits Wij(1), Wij(2), and Wij(3) are defined by
Wij(1) = wij(1)⊕w′i j(1),
Wij(2) = wij(2)⊕w′i j(2),
Wij(3) = wij(3)⊕w′i j(3).
(7)
If we denote Dij = (wij(1)w′i j(1)wij(2)w
′
i j(2)wij(3)w
′
i j(3))
then any of the D-values (000000), (000011), (001100),
(110000), (111100), (110011), (001111), and (111111) indi-
cates no-tampering of (i, j)th pixel. It gives Wij(l) = 0
(where l = 1, 2, 3) and as a result we get the value of Wij = 0,
(i.e., Wij = 0 indicates no-tampering of (i, j)th pixel). For
other 56 D-values Wij = 1 and it indicates tampering of
(i, j)th pixel. Hence if a pixel is detected as tampered by this
approach it is 100% accurate. However, if a pixel is detected
as not tampered then it is possible that the pixel is tampered.
This is called false-negative detection and it occurs because
25(= 32) MSBs are mapped to 23(= 8) watermarks, which is
equivalent to mapping 4 MSB symbols to 1 LSB symbol and
thus it facilitates tampering.
To handle false-positive tamper detection, the aggressive
tamper detection AgTDM is defined as follows:
W =Wij(1) |Wij(2) |Wij(3) |Wij(4) |Wij(5), (8)
where the operand bits Wij(t), t = 1 · · · 5 are defined by
Wij(1) = wij(1)⊕w′i j(1),
Wij(2) = wij(2)⊕w′i j(2),
Wij(3) = wij(3)⊕w′i j(3),
Wij(4) = wij(1)⊕w′i j(2),
Wij(5) = wij(1)⊕w′i j(3).
(9)
It is important to note that the matching relationships
between wij(1) and w′i j(2) in Wij(4), and wij(1) and w
′
i j(3)
in Wij(5) are independent of pixel tampering. These rela-
tionships are included in the AgTDM to artificially increase
the false- positive tamper detection (in turn this will increase
actual tampered pixel detection). Note that this is one of the
novelties of the technique.
In this approach, the two D-values (000000) and
(111111) are considered for the detection of not-tampered
pixels and other 6 values are considered for the detection of
tampered pixel in addition to remaining 56 values. This logic
is called an aggressive logic and it is derived from the fact that
it is difficult for an attacker to tamper a pixel that will give
the D-values (000000) or (111111) than other six D-values.
Due to its aggressiveness, this approach introduces false-
positive tamper detection (i.e., it can detect not-tampered
pixels as tampered pixels—Figure 2 illustrates this scenario).
Now the goal is to combine tamper detection responses of
NgTDM and AgTDM to make the final tamper detection
response. This process is carried out by the module DET in
Not tampered
Tampered
(a)
Detected as not
tampered
Detected as
not tampered
Detected as
tampered
(b)
More detected as
not tampered and
few detected as
tampered
More detected as
tampered and very
few detected as not
tampered
Detected as
tampered
(c)
Figure 2: (a) An actual tampered scenario, (b) possible tamper
detection response of NgTDM, and (c) possible detection response
of AgTDM.
Figure 1(b). The DET module uses the following decision
rule for detection response.
Note that if a pixel is detected as tampered by NgTDM,
then it is not possible for AgTDM to detect it as a not-
tampered pixel; hence, no rule is considered for this case.
2.4. Generalized Approach. The proposed 5MSB:3LSB tech-
nique can be easily generalized to nMSB:(8-n)LSB due to
its simplicity. This generalization will lead to a trade-off
between the image quality (i.e., PSNR value) and tamper
resistance (i.e., TRP value). For example, if 4MSB:4LSB
approach is selected we can certainly improve the tamper
resistance capability (i.e., high TRP), but the quality of
the image formed by the original 4MSB is not acceptable
(low PSNR). Similarly, if the 6MSB:2LSB is selected the
quality of the image can certainly be improved (high PSNR)
but the tamper resistance capability will be very low (i.e.,
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Input: Watermarked Image
Output: Tampered and Not-Tampered Pixels
(1) If a pixel is detected as tampered by NgTDM then the pixel is certainly
a tampered pixel;
(2) If a pixel is detected by both NgTDM and AgTDM as not tampered then
the pixel is considered a not-tampered pixel;
(3) If a pixel is detected by NgTDM as not tampered and detected by
AgTDM as tampered then
(3.1) If this pixel belongs to a block (8× 8 pixels) that consists of all
pixels that are detected by NgTDM as not tampered then the pixel
is considered not tampered;
(3.2) Else if the pixel has middle gray value using the 5-MSB bits (i.e.,
between 112 and 136 inclusive) then the pixel is high likely
tampered otherwise the pixel is not tampered.
Algorithm 1: Pixel-Level Tamper Detection Rule.
Table 1: Comparison of proposed SS and ZW methods.
(a)
Image (1)
Names
PSNR (2)
SS method
PSNR (3)
ZW method
Time (4)
SS method
Time (5)
ZW method
Biltmore 38.30 37.97 12.86 154.78
Lena 38.17 37.94 12.66 154.77
UNCG 37.74 37.87 12.64 154.38
Flower Grdn 37.72 37.90 12.66 155.13
House+Tree 37.65 37.83 12.64 153.14
(b)
Actually (6)
Tampered
Detection (7) False (8) False (9)
Rates Negative Positive
SS ZW SS ZW SS ZW
4211 99.81% 69% 0.19% 0.31% 0.35% 2.18%
4184 99.90% 65% 0.10% 0.35% 2.31% 2.23%
4140 99.73% 65% 0.27% 0.35% 0.99% 2.20%
4098 99.39% 0.65 0.61% 0.35% 1.60% 2.29%
4186 99.95% 66% 0.05% 0.34% 1.06% 2.15%
low TRP). Also 26(= 64) MSBs are mapped to 22 (= 4)
watermarks causing significant increase in the false-negative
pixels. Hence 5MSB:3LSB approach is preferable than other
methods including 4MSB:4LSB and 6MSB:2LSB.
3. Simulation Results
Simulation results have been obtained using several images
but the results of “Biltmore Estate” image are presented in
Figures 3(a)–3(f). The results collated from several images
are also presented in Table 1. The actual size of the images
considered in this paper is 256 × 256 pixels. Figures 3(a)
and 4(a) show the original “Biltmore Estate” and “UNCG”
images and they are used to watermark using both the
proposed (SS) and Zhang-Wang (ZW) [7] approaches. The
Matlab code provided by X . Zhang and S. Wang has been
used to obtain results of their approach. Figure 3(b) shows
the tamper data and locations, and this tamper data alter
4211 pixels with α = 0.1631 (where α is the ratio between the
number of tampered blocks and the total number of blocks
[7]).
Figure 3(a) is watermarked using the SS approach and
then tampered according to the data in Figure 3(b). PSNR
of the SS watermarked image is 38.30 dB. The difference
between this tampered image and the original is shown
in Figure 3(c). Similarly, ZW approach is used and its
corresponding PSNR is 37.97 and the difference image is
shown in Figure 3(d). The close PSNR values in Table 1
(columns 2 and 3) show that the watermark embedded by
the SS and ZW approaches affect the quality of the images
the same way, however, the other parameters such as the
computational time, detection rate, false-positive, and false-
negative show that the SS approach performs better than ZW
approach. Also the high PSNR values and the Figures 3(c)
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(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 3: Simulation results. (a) Original “Biltmore Estate” image
of size 256 × 256 pixels, (b) tamper data and their locations, (c)
proposed watermark and tampered data-PSNR = 38.30 dB, (d)
Zhang-Wang watermark and tampered data-PSNR = 37.97, (e)
tampered pixels detected by AgTDM, and (f) tampered pixels
detected by ZW approach.
and 3(d) show that the proposed watermarks do not degrade
the image properties in homogeneous regions compared to
ZW approach.
In Figures 3(e) and 3(f), the watermarks extracted using
the AgTDM and ZW approach are presented, respectively.
It can be seen from the patterns that the watermark
extracted using AgTDM is much closer to the actual
watermark (see Figure 3(b)). Findings are as follows:
AgTDM detects 4420 pixels as tampered pixels where 3997
are certainly tampered pixels and 423 (which include 206
tampered pixels and 217 not-tampered pixels) are high
likely tampered pixels. That is, 4203(= 3997 + 206) tam-
pered pixels have been detected with 217 false-positive
pixels and 8 false-negative pixels. In other words, AgTDM
is capable of detecting 99.8% (4203/4211) of tampered
pixels with 0.35% (217/61325) false-positive detection and
0.19% (8/4211) false-negative detection. ZW approach
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
Figure 4: Simulation results. (a) Original “UNCG” image of size
256 × 256 pixels, (b) tamper data and their locations, (c) proposed
watermark and tampered data–PSNR = 37.74 dB, (d) Zhang-
Wang watermark and tampered data–PSNR = 37.87, (e) tampered
pixels detected by AgTDM, and (f) tampered pixels detected by ZW
approach.
detects 2912 tampered pixels with 1299 false-negative and
1341 false-positive pixels. The simulation also indicates
that the proposed extraction takes about 12.86 seconds
cputime (Matlab function) whereas ZW approach takes
154.78 seconds. The corresponding images of the “UNCG”
image are displayed in Figures 4(b)–4(f). They demonstrate
the similar results. The collated results, using several images,
in Table 1 follow the same arguments and they support the
same conclusions.
4. Conclusion
A fragile image watermarking scheme is proposed in this
study. The proposed scheme is a 5MSB:3LSB technique and
capable of detecting pixel-level tampering present in the 5
MSBs. This scheme has also introduced nonaggressive and
aggressive tamper detection methods. The novelty of the
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aggressiveness is that it artificially increases the false-positive
tamper detection to increase the accuracy of the actual
tampered pixel detection. Using these tamper detection,
superior pixel-level tamper detection can be achieved with
negligible false-negative and false-positive tamper detection
responses.
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Preliminary call for papers
The 2011 European Signal Processing Conference (EUSIPCO 2011) is the
nineteenth in a series of conferences promoted by the European Association for
Signal Processing (EURASIP, www.eurasip.org). This year edition will take place
in Barcelona, capital city of Catalonia (Spain), and will be jointly organized by the
Centre Tecnològic de Telecomunicacions de Catalunya (CTTC) and the
Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya (UPC).
EUSIPCO 2011 will focus on key aspects of signal processing theory and
li ti li t d b l A t f b i i ill b b d lit
Organizing Committee
Honorary Chair
Miguel A. Lagunas (CTTC)
General Chair
Ana I. Pérez Neira (UPC)
General Vice Chair
Carles Antón Haro (CTTC)
Technical Program Chair
Xavier Mestre (CTTC)
Technical Program Co Chairsapp ca ons as s e e ow. ccep ance o su m ss ons w e ase on qua y,
relevance and originality. Accepted papers will be published in the EUSIPCO
proceedings and presented during the conference. Paper submissions, proposals
for tutorials and proposals for special sessions are invited in, but not limited to,
the following areas of interest.
Areas of Interest
• Audio and electro acoustics.
• Design, implementation, and applications of signal processing systems.
l d l d d
Javier Hernando (UPC)
Montserrat Pardàs (UPC)
Plenary Talks
Ferran Marqués (UPC)
Yonina Eldar (Technion)
Special Sessions
Ignacio Santamaría (Unversidad
de Cantabria)
Mats Bengtsson (KTH)
Finances
Montserrat Nájar (UPC)• Mu time ia signa processing an co ing.
• Image and multidimensional signal processing.
• Signal detection and estimation.
• Sensor array and multi channel signal processing.
• Sensor fusion in networked systems.
• Signal processing for communications.
• Medical imaging and image analysis.
• Non stationary, non linear and non Gaussian signal processing.
Submissions
Tutorials
Daniel P. Palomar
(Hong Kong UST)
Beatrice Pesquet Popescu (ENST)
Publicity
Stephan Pfletschinger (CTTC)
Mònica Navarro (CTTC)
Publications
Antonio Pascual (UPC)
Carles Fernández (CTTC)
I d i l Li i & E hibi
Procedures to submit a paper and proposals for special sessions and tutorials will
be detailed at www.eusipco2011.org. Submitted papers must be camera ready, no
more than 5 pages long, and conforming to the standard specified on the
EUSIPCO 2011 web site. First authors who are registered students can participate
in the best student paper competition.
Important Deadlines:
P l f i l i 15 D 2010
n ustr a a son x ts
Angeliki Alexiou
(University of Piraeus)
Albert Sitjà (CTTC)
International Liaison
Ju Liu (Shandong University China)
Jinhong Yuan (UNSW Australia)
Tamas Sziranyi (SZTAKI Hungary)
Rich Stern (CMU USA)
Ricardo L. de Queiroz (UNB Brazil)
Webpage: www.eusipco2011.org
roposa s or spec a sess ons ec
Proposals for tutorials 18 Feb 2011
Electronic submission of full papers 21 Feb 2011
Notification of acceptance 23 May 2011
Submission of camera ready papers 6 Jun 2011
